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Abstracts
Title of Research paper:

Economic Analysis on the Sustainability of Slow
Steaming in Liner Shipping

Degree:

M.Sc.

The research paper is a sustainability assessment of a widely adopted strategy - slow
steaming in liner shipping. A complete overview of both effectiveness and impact of
speed reduction are examined to evaluate market feedbacks on this strategy. With
highly compliments on this strategy in bunker costs saving, absorption of excess
tonnage and good environmental performance, and this paper challenge the feasibility
of slow steaming by thorough speed-related costs analysis creating a breakeven point
for the average value for one loaded Forty Feet Container. An application on Far
East/North America proves that a large number of liner services now under slow
steaming being inappropriate for adopting this strategy. The average value for one
FEU exporting from Far East is set to be a filter eliminating those services which are
sacrificing shippers’ interest with more in-transit inventory costs. Additionally,
cancellation of ports of calls for these “non-slow-steaming” services is more effective
coping with the high bunker price. Slow steaming is just an un-optimal optimization
which could be effective for both shipping lines and shippers combined with
synchronous re-design of liner services.
KEYWORDS: Slow Steaming, Liner Shipping Market, Transit Inventory Costs, Far
East/North America Trade, Sustainability Analysis
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background

The financial crisis and economic recession dominated the international community
since December, 2008, which put strong pressure on maritime sector. Unsurprisingly,
shipping lines struggled with a series of problem, such as, overcapacity in fleet due to
the high enthusiasm ordering newbuildings in 2007-08; dramatic fluctuations in
bunker price and louder voice on green shipping development. (Notteboom &
Rodrigue, 2010)

Slow steaming is the one of the “products” from the above scenarios, which is widely
adopted in current operational process. Apparent benefits from slow steaming
contributed a great cost-savings for carriers both in bunker consumption and
absorption for extra-capacities. (AXS-Alphaliner, 2010) Moreover, the carbon dioxide
emission has been controlled effectively through reduction in fuel consumption. Due
to the depressed market climate, this strategy became more and more popular in liner
shipping operation. According to the United Nation Conference on Trade and
Development, by 2009, there were 42.9% of vessels and 34.8% of services were
under slow-steaming. (UNCTAD, 2010, p. 61) In the year of 2010, majority of liner
companies set this strategy as a long-term tactic dealing with impacts from the
recession. Significantly, most of them are big players, like Maersk announced that
“slow steaming is here to stay”, (MAERSK, 2010) CMA CGM applied super slow
steaming as a standard for CMA CGM vessels. (Gerard, 2010)
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However, when shipping lines advocated substantially for the slow steaming,
criticisms and concerns about this strategy arouse across the related industry. Shippers
complained and questioned slow steaming for the increasing stock cost regarding
longer transit time. As the Elkem, the Norwegian silicon producer claimed in 2010
that the carriers have made a lot of savings but the financial impact on the customers
has never been investigated. (Marle, 2010, p. 3)

Despite the operational and financial aspects, the environmental contribution from
slow steaming is considerable. Box shipping giant, A.P. Moller-Maersk reduced 9% of
CO2 emissions in 2008 compared to 2007. More significantly, every 10% of speed
reduction helps to reduce 19% of CO2 emission per ton-mile. (UNCTAD, 2010, p. 66)
Nevertheless, certain technical barriers are still to be addressed. (Faber, Freund,
Kopke, & Nelissen, 2010, p. 23)

The cooperation between liner shipping companies and associated businesses
highlights the globalization; it is worthy thinking over the truth of slow steaming in
today’s liner shipping operation concerning all the interested parties and issues. From
all the perspectives above, this paper intends to evaluate the sustainability of slow
steaming in liner shipping market. Is this just a transient fashion or a strategy here to
stay?

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The first objective of the paper is to investigate current and potential effects and
concerns brought by slow steaming through the whole value chain. The second
objective of the paper is to determine the sustainability of slow steaming subject to
several correlative factors. The third objective of the paper is to prove the assumption
through an application to Far East/America trade route.
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1.3 Methodology

The purpose of the paper is to analyze and assess the sustainability of slow steaming
in an overall perspective. To achieve the mentioned goal, the paper will first analyze
speed-related economic factors of this strategy based on current circumstances and
future trends. Meanwhile, value for one Forty Feet Container (FEU) exporting from
Far East to United States will be estimated representing inventory costs which largely
neglected by shipping lines. Secondly, a cost analysis/comparison from initial to
actual speed is used to create a threshold for inventory cost, i.e., the average value of
containerisable cargo on board. To make the approach more clear, we will simply use
a case study of “Shanghai-Rotterdam” trade seeing the tendency of breakeven point
when going slow. Thirdly, based on the model, breakeven points for each liner service
which under slow steaming currently on Far East/North America are used to compare
with the filter - the average value of containerisable cargo to assess whether slow
steaming is feasible and sustainable.

1.4 Outline of the Paper

Chapter 2, literature review, intends to overview relevant research papers and
market reports/comments on the slow steaming. Several studies highlight effects of
slow steaming across the value chain. Chapter 3, economic factors in slow steaming.
In this chapter, three major speed-related costs will be presented and analyzed for
corresponding current situation and future development direction. Chapter 4,
sustainability of slow steaming in liner shipping. Configuration of algebra model is
to determine the sustainability of slow steaming by creating the threshold for
inventory costs. Then an application to Far East/North America is used to assess the
feasibility and sustainability of slow steaming on that trade route. Chapter 5,
conclusions. The summary of findings, implication and limitations of this study and
practical recommendation will be presented.
3

Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction

As stated in the previous chapter, the slow steaming raised the attention from
shipping-related markets. From the sake of shipping line, cost reduction with revenue
soaking up is always the theme of operation. With sky-high bunker price, reducing the
speed seems an effective way to cut fuel consumption. Furthermore, the emission of
Green-House Gas (GHG) could be substantially reduced through the slow steaming
which relieves the environmental debt of liner companies. However, an inevitable
consequence of slow steaming is longer transit time which shippers are reluctant to
accept. Since shipping lines no longer radiate global container trades, the liner service
tends to a more customer-oriented differentiation exercise. (Notteboom, 2004, p. 95)
Time increasing at sea adding with some unexpected delays elevates shippers’
inventory level and supply chain management afterwards.

In this chapter, we will first review the effectiveness of slow steaming. Next the time
factor in logistics will be observed. Finally, different quantitative methods assessing
the sustainability of slow steaming will be studied.

2.2 Effectiveness of Slow Steaming

The wide adoption of slow steaming across liner operation, to some extent, is not
irrational. The main three advantages of slow steaming is reduction in fuel
consumption, controlling in GHG emissions and absorption of extra capacities.
4

(Drewry Shipping Consultancy, 2010)

2.2.1 Effect on Fuel Cost

(1) Considerable fuel cost in liner shipping

Firstly, bunker price increased considerably. According to various databases such as,
Clarkson Research Lab, Bunker world, since 2007, bunker prices in port of Rotterdam
have increased steeply and peaked at $679.5/ton in July, 2008. Logically, given the
persistent high bunker price and extraordinary cost on bunker, shipping lines are
challenged to control fuel consumptions. Vernimmen, B., and T.E., Notteboom (2009)
provided three major ways coping with the high bunker price (a) the use of cheaper
grades of bunker; (b) actions in vessels design and (c) actions with regard to the
commercial speed of fleet and the scale of the vessels. (Vernimmen & Notteboom,
2009) Fuel cost falls into the category of voyage cost in a tradition method of
shipping cost allocation. Secondly, bunker cost is a considerable part of shipping cost.
Stopford, M. (1997) pointed out that fuel cost accounts for 47% of voyage cost
applying to all the shipping sectors. (Stopford, 1997, p. 160) Specifically, during
2008-09, this proportion, in liner shipping, has been raised up to 56% according to the
calculation of OOCL annual report. (Oriental Overseas (International) Limited , 2009)
Vernimmen and Notteboom (2009) identified that a succession of companies reporting
on the effect of high bunker expense standing on their accounting bottom line.
(Vernimmen & Notteboom, 2009, p. 326)

(2) Relationship between speed and fuel consumption

Firstly, J.J., Corbett, Wang, H.F. and Winebrake, J.J. (2009) represented that fuel
consumption (FC) of merchant vessels directly links to main engine power (P).
(Corbett, Wang, & Winebrake, 2009) Generally, fuel consumption is based on
installed power, load factors for main and auxiliaries engines as given speed. So,
5

based on this, Psaraftis, H.N. and C.A., Kontovas (2010) gave the formula as follows:

FC (tn / day ) = BSFC ( gr / kWh) ×10 −6 (tn / gr ) × P(kW ) × 24(h / day )

(2.1)

The authors concluded with several surveys with engine manufacturers that “Brake
specific fuel consumption” (BSFC) can be a constant since the variance in BSFC is
not very high. Therefore, the rest variable, power of engine, is related to the fuel
consumption. (Psaraftis & Kontovas, 2010) Whilst another expression of BSFC is
SFOC (specific fuel oil consumption), Cariou, P. (2011) calculated the daily
consumption of main engine by taking load factor into consideration because vessels
are built to sail at designed speed, which is 70%-90% of the maximum continuous
rate (MCR). So, in most studies, the SFOC or BSFC are set around 180-195gr/kWh.
(Cariou, 2011)

Secondly, as a rule of thumb, a cubic relationship is used to determine the relationship
between speed and fuel consumption. (Faber, Freund, Kopke, & Nelissen, 2010, p. 7)
Several studies confirmed that. Notteboom T.E. and P. Cariou (2009) used 2,245
observations from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay Ship Database resulting in an exponent
of 3.331 with R2=0.99 through regression model (Notteboom & Cariou, 2009)
However, the cubic law is not always existed. According to the Barrass, C.B. (2004),
for speed exceeding 20 knots, an exponent of 4 or greater is to be used. (Barrass, 2004)
MAN Diesel (2006) proposed a relationship in the power of 4.5 for large high-speed
container vessels.

(3) Slow steaming in reducing fuel consumption

With high bunker price and exponential relationship between speed and fuel
consumption, reduction in speed was set as an operational method dealing with the
fuel puzzle. In this part, we will examine the effectiveness of slow steaming in
6

reducing fuel consumption.

Most researches showed that speed reduction decreased the fuel consumption
dramatically in accordance to various vessel categories. Vernimmen and Notteboom
(2009) evaluated relationship between speed reduction and daily fuel consumption
through four vessel capacity categories (3,000 TEU, 5,000 TEU, 8,000 TEU and
10,000 TEU) based on statistics from Germanischer Lloyd. As it turned out, by given
the bunker price $450/ton at that time, for an 8,000TEU vessel, service speed going
down from 26 to 23 knots saved daily fuel consumption by 80 tonnes and reserved the
reduction of $36,000 in daily running cost. Furthermore, according to their research
methodology, the measurement of fuel consumption should be on the basis of
transported unit, in the liner shipping, TEU (twenty feet equivalent unit). Under the
same speed of 22 knots, cost difference between a 5,000TEU vessel and 12,000TEU
vessel is 39%. At the speed of 24 knots, the cost difference reached to 41%.
(Vernimmen & Notteboom, 2009) Later on, Notteboom and Cariou (2009) reviewed
that relationship in terms of per TEU-mile obtaining the bunker price at $350/tonne. It
appears that vessels in the range between 5,000 and 10,000+TEU give similar and
better results based on fuel cost per TEU-mile, under the same circumstance with
Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009), the cost difference is around 7%. (Notteboom &
Cariou, 2009) Kontovas and Psaraftis (2010) provided a generic formula illustrating
the fuel consumption (FC) with slow steaming strategy considering the time in port.
Combined the fact that many vessels reporting sailing speed halved the normal speed,
they used “a” fraction (0<a<1) to define the new speed. Moreover, in order to observe
the fuel consumption in different legs within one voyage, they divided the
consumption in “at sea” and “at port”. The conclusion is if time in port is constant or
less, speed reduction, for both cases, leads to a decrease in fuel consumption per trip.

2.2.2 Effect on Emission Reduction

At the 58th session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), held in
7

London in October 2008, actions regarding to air pollution from ships was mixed.
Eefsen, T., and Cerup-Simonsen, B., (2010) and Psaraftis & Kontovas (2009) stated
that containerships represent 4% of global fleet but emitted 20% of CO2 from
international shipping. (Psarafits & Kontovas, 2009) (Eefesen & Cerup-Simonsen,
2010) So, in this section, we will review results from several researches concerning
contribution to GHG emission reduction.

(1) The measurement of emission

Generally, the “emission factor” is used in determining the GHG emission. By
definition, the emission factor refers to how many kilograms of CO2 are emitted per
ton of fuel burned. Logically, by multiplying the quantities of fuel consumed, we
could have how many CO2 are released to the atmosphere. In early literature, factor of
3.17 was settled from an empirical test. However, whether this result is appropriate
depends on the parameters. Kontovas and Psaraftis (2010) argued that 3.17 factor was
not fuel-dependant. It tends to divide into Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) and Marine Diesel
Oil (MDO) separately. Guideline 2006 from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) showed that the factor 3.13 is for HFO while 3.19 for MDO. More
recently, in MEPC 58/4/3 (2008), INTERTANKO based on the average carbon
molecular weight in relevant fuels and conducted a workshop setting 3.082 for MDO,
3.075 for Low Sulphur Fuel Oils (LSFO) and 3.021 for High Sulphur Fuel Oils
(HSFO) (International Maritime Organization, 2008) Nevertheless, Cadaro, M.A.,
Lopez, L.A., Comez, N. and Tobarra, M.A. (2010) took other factors including the
distance cover, the tonnage transported and the means of transport chosen into
account. The study was based on Spanish export and import which showed that inland
transportation took a large proportion to GHG emission through the box distribution.
(Cadarso, Lopez, Gomez, & Tobarra, 2011)

(2) Slow steaming in CO2 emission reduction
8

Cariou (2011) assessed the impact of slow steaming on CO2 emission reduction from
2008 to 2010, both in trade lanes and vessels types (1,000-2,000TEU,
2,000-3,000TEU, 3,000-5,000TEU, 5,000-8,000TEU and >8,000TEU) through the
data from Alphaliner and Lloyd’s Register Fairplay (LRF). The author used the
following formula to estimate the CO2 emission change where ME stands for fuel
consumption by main engine regarding to SFOC, load factor in 90% and engine
power while D refers to time at sea or port respectively assuming that consumption at
port is 5% of which at sea.

n

ΔCO2 = 3.17 × ∑ ( MEk ,sea × Dk ,sea + MEk , port × Dk , port )

(2.2)

MEk = SFOCk × LFk × P

(2.3)

k =1

Under their estimation, the result showed that in 2010, CO2 reduction decreased by 11%
resulting from slow steaming even through taking 137 more vessels to maintain the
service schedule. There was more significant reduction in the mega-sector, emissions
from vessels capacities over 8,000TEU reduced more than 17%. On trade differences,
in the scale of 387 services into eight routes, two biggest reductions occurred on
Multi-trade, services covering more than two trade routes, such as around-the-world
and pendulum services achieved more effective than Europe/Far East routes. The
former (35.1% of capacity) decreased about 16.5% of GHG emission while the latter
(14.6% of capacity) represented reduction in CO2 emission by 16.4% compared to
2008. This 11.1% of reduction evidenced a fall from 170 million tonnes of CO2 in
2008 to 151 million in 2010. (Cariou, 2011) Similar study generated by Corbett et al.,
(2009) demonstrated that when the emission reduction can be up to 70% when the
speed is halved. (Corbett, Wang, & Winebrake, 2009) Alternatively, Psaraftis et al.,
(2009, 2010) stated that emissions can be reduced even further through cutting time in
port without any extra capacities introduced into operation. To maintain a constant
total trip time, one knot decreasing in speed will lead to a 25 minute increasing in
voyage time. If it were available, this would to be a very satisfactory result with 10%
9

reduction in emissions. However, they also pointed that it needs drastic port
re-engineering and performance improvements. (Kontovas, Psaraftis, & Kakalis,
2009)

2.2.3 Effect on Extra Capacities Absorption

Prior to the crisis, newbuilding market was frenzy. Shipyards struggled to meet the
huge appetites from shipping lines ordering new and bigger vessels. (Notteboom &
Rodrigue, 2010, p. 18) Thus, with the “impressive” downturn in demand of container
trade, in 2009, trade volumes firstly dropped in the past two decades, by 9%
according to the figure from UNCATD, which means that 124 million TEUs loss
occurred that year. (UNCTAD, 2010) Shipping lines dealt to with the
supply-demand-imbalance problem mainly in three ways: short-term idling ships;
cancellation of order; and slow steaming. So, in this sector, we will review some
literatures related to the effectiveness in absorbing extra capacities.

(1) Determination of effectiveness on absorption

Notteboom (2006) and Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009) gave one inequality
limiting the minimal number vessels deployed on a specific service depending on the
desired service frequency and vessel speed.

n

S≥

(∑ T pi +
i =1

D
)× F
V × 24
7

(2.4)

where 7 stands for the 7 days/week. Normally, shipping carriers will try to have at
least a weekly service. (Notteboom, 2006, p. 20) Tr is the round voyage time in days;
Tpi is the total port time in port i in days; D is the distance of round voyage in nautical
meters (nm); V is the vessels speed. (Vernimmen & Notteboom, 2009) But there is no
very generic algorithm in this formula, just setting a baseline. Kontovas and Psaraftis
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(2009) connected the speed variation to vessel number and proved their configuration
through Aframax tanker and Panamax bulker fleet through the following equation as

L
L
⎛
⎞
+
+ T AB
⎜
⎟
V1 − ΔV V2 − ΔV
⎜
ΔN = N ×
− 1⎟
⎜
⎟
L L
+
+ T AB
⎜
⎟
V1 V2
⎝
⎠

(2.5)

with ΔN is additional vessel number into operation to maintain the same throughput;
L is voyage distance; V1 and V2 stands for different speed in laden and ballast leg
respectively; ΔV is how many knots speed reduced; TAB is total port time in a round
voyage. (Psaraftis & Kontovas, 2009)

(2) Slow steaming in extra-capacities absorption

Vernimmen and Notteboom (2009) compared the deployment profile on Far
East/Europe route in February 2005 and December 2007. The average number of
vessels deployed on this route in two years is 8.12 and 8.50, separately. With the
introduction of the ninth vessel to fix a weekly service, as a matter of fact, there were
no less than 11 Far East/Europe loops in 2007 using 9 vessels while in 2005 there
were only 4 such loops. They also revealed that due to entry of bigger vessels,
deployment of nine 9,500TEU vessels at lower speed (20-24knots) together with
cancellation of ports of call could be just the same as eight smaller vessels at normal
speed to guarantee the same weekly call. (Vernimmen & Notteboom, 2009, pp.
332-334) On the shipping lines side, slow steaming is not sufficient. Re-designing the
service route, especially on the backhaul from Europe to Far East, became more and
more popular among shipping lines. Rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope rather than
Suez Canal attributed to longer distance which directly need 10 vessels on average.
Furthermore, the cost from canal transition could also be cut off. The typical example
of this is Maersk Line, 15 services rerouted from the Cape compared to only 6 such
services in early 2009. (Containerisation International, 2009) More significant effects
11

could be seen from Alphaliner. In the beginning of 2010, the so-called extra slow
steaming (17-18 knots) absorbed 2.3% of ship capacities equivalent to 230,000 TEUs.
This 2.3% of absorption rate almost doubled at the end of 2010 with 4.4% of the
cellular fleet representing 625,000 TEUs. The analysis also pointed out that the upper
limit of absorption through extra slow steaming would therefore stand at about
900,000 to 1 million TEU in total or 7% of current fleet capacities. (AXS-Alphaliner,
2010)

To sum up, in this part, we reviewed several research papers and analyses based on
the effectiveness of slow steaming and further extra slow steaming from three aspects:
reduction in fuel consumption, controlling in GHG emission and absorption in extra
capacities. Most outcomes were very impressive and probably this is why shipping
lines had a big crush on slow steaming. However, concerns were also mentioned in
these papers such as damage to main engine, rudder control and some maritime safety
issues. But the most remarkable point is the longer transit time from slow steaming.
So in next sector, negative sides of slow steaming concerning with time factor will be
studied.

2.3 Time Impact of Slow Steaming

As the old adage goes that “there is no free lunch”, slow steaming is not 100% perfect.
Obviously, longer transit time is the direct consequence of slow steaming. In this
section, we will review several time related factors in logistics and consequences of
longer transit time.

2.3.1 Time Related Factors in Logistics

(1) Lead time (LT)

Lumsden (2007) defined that lead-time is the time from order placement to delivery
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or the customers waiting time. The shorter lead-time, the more trustworthiness the
company will gain. (Lumsden, 2007) More specific definition of lead time is provided
by Tersine (1982) which consisting orders preparation, order transit, supplier lead
time, delivery time and set-up time. (Tersine, 1982) It is widely recognized that the
lead time is composed by time of delivery ( t L ) and time of order ( t d ) in the equation
followed:

(2.6)

LT = t L + t d

To avoid stock out situation, the inventory should be large enough during the lead
time.

(2) Safety Stock (SS)

The inventory should cover the demand for the entire goods flow. (Lumsden, 2007)
This means that the inventory along with the normal demand (D), which is satisfied
by the cycle stock. Statistically, demand during lead time (DDLT) always follows a
normal distribution with its expected DDLT (EDDLT) and reorder point defining as
EDDLT+SS. (Vernimmen, Dullaert, & Engelen, 2007, p. 206) Safety stock aims at to
meet the extra demands during the lead time in the case of stock out.

SS = Z × σ

(2.7)

where Z the safety factor is a value which limits the probability of a stock-out during
any lead time period; σ is the standard deviation of DDLT. If the lead time is
independent of demand and demands itself is not autocorrelated1, the σ could be
calculated as:

(2.8)

σ = ( L × σ D2 ) + ( D 2 × σ L2 )
1

Today’s demand does not rely on the yesterday’s data.
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Where, D refers to the average demand, L refers to the average lead time; σ D2 is the
variance of demand while σ L2 is the variance of lead time.

2.3.2 Impact from Longer Transit Time

The most significant impact from slow steaming is adding more inventory cost to
shippers/consignees. Notteboom (2006) stated that short transit time is a competitive
factor in liner shipping, in particular with time-sensitive goods. The author generated
a calculation of one delay of a post-Panamax vessel at sea generating substantial costs
for the shipping line. Assuming one TEU cargo worthies €40,000, typically, the
inventory cost consists following two parts: (a) opportunity costs (3%-4% per year)
and (b) economic depreciation (10%-30% per year for consumer products). The
inventory cost on daily basis will be at least €57,000. Compared to the time charter
rate for post-Panamax ($40,000 per day), the inventory cost is much higher, indicating
that the shipping line could definitely charter out the vessel rather than operate it.
(Notteboom, 2006) Similar studies run by Stemmer (2008) investigated more specific
on the transport cost composed by transportation cost2 and inventory carrying cost
with high and low valued cargo categories. The conclusion is more significant.
Inventory cost averages at 58.5% of the total costs of transport depending on low
($5,000/TEU) and high cargo ($10,000/TEU) value in different scenarios of long and
short transit time. But the author focused more on the sea transportation section rather
than the further supply chain management. (Stemmler, 2008)

More complete analysis on the time impact on logistics is driven by Vernimmen B.,
Dullaert W. and Engelen S. (2007) combining all the time related factors in logistics
management. The paper used one case study one service from Santos (Brazil) to Port
Elizabeth (South Africa) between which the voyage could be covered in 7 days

2

The sum represents the costs of the physical transport, including freight charges, handling cost, fees and
commissions from the source to the destination of unit cargo.
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implying the vessel speed is 24 knots. On the other side, the lead time3 of goods of
shippers/consignees is 3+8.1+1=12.1 days. The variance of lead time is
1+1.68+0.5=3.18 day2.

Based on the equation (2.8), the paper showed that 0.5 day reduction in voyage will
results decrease the standard deviation of DDLT (defined in section 2.3.1) more than
20%, resulting in a similar decreasing in safety stock level (number of containers in
warehouse). Moreover, safety stock is directly related to the inventory cost. The paper
also analyzed the benefits of 20% reduction in safety stock even with both high and
low value spare parts. For the low value cargo (€20,000 per container load), this 0.5
days reduction in transit time leads to a decreasing in safety stock of 40.13 containers
with a cost saving of €240,780. For high-value spare parts (€100,000 per container
load), the result is more significant with a substantial cost saving at €2,000,000 on
the annual basis!!! (Vernimmen, Dullaert, & Engelen, 2007, pp. 207-209)

In conclusion, most studies highlighted the time both in liner shipping and supply
chain management. With longer time in carriage of goods, the impact on the shippers
is amplified. There is no way that shipping line pay no attention to the customers. So,
in the next section, we will go through more on the assessing the sustainability of
slow steaming considering both sides.

2.4 Quantitative Methods on Sustainability of Slow Steaming

Many papers and researches glued benefits and potential expenses together observing
the sustainability of slow teaming major for the sake of shipping lines. Several
researches took deep insight on the cost/benefits of this strategy seeking under which
circumstances that the slow steaming could be applied. In this section, several
cost/benefits analysis from bunker price and speed optimization setting the benchmark
3

The lead time includes the time of carriage before port of loading, transit time and oncarriage to shippers’
premises.
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of sustainability of slow steaming.

2.4.1 Bunker Price Benchmarking (BP*)

Cariou (2011) analyzed that the long-term sustainability of slow steaming depends on
the additional operational cost for the n vessel added ( OC Δn ), on changes in the
inventory costs ( ICteu ) multiplied by extra time ( ΔRot ) at sea when vessels are slow
steaming.4 The strategy sustained only under the circumstance that bunker price
(IFO) on east/west route is in the scale of $350-400 per ton. The equation is as

followed.

BP* ≥

OC Δn ,ds→ ss + ΔRot ds→ss × ICteu
ΔFC ds→ss

(2.9)

The author indicated that as long as the current bunker price is significantly over the
BP*, slow steaming is viable as well as controls the CO2 emission. The different
bunker price break-even points on different services routes are attached within Figure
1. Figure 1 depicts the results on different services routes, comparison with the

maximum and minimum bunker price in Rotterdam. Implications from results are as
followed, in the Australia/Oceania, Latin America/Caribbean trades, the bunker
break-even point is relatively high (over the maximum IFO price in Rotterdam) as a
result of the low ratio between time at sea, and time in port. For other trades, the
BP*is close to the average value in Rotterdam, the author suggested that a tax levy of
around $50 could be enough to pass the break-even point.

However, limitations appeared in this methodology, the apparent one is less
consideration of inventory costs for different value of cargo. The assumption of one

4

Speed changes from designed speed (ds) to slow steaming (ss) with different types of vessel according to
respective deployment.
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ship k operating from origin i to destination j is shown the equation:

⎛ (C + P × AFk )× S 03k
S1k = ⎜⎜ k
2 P × MFk
⎝

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

1

3

(2.10)

where C k the fixed cost per day for ship k including capital cost; P stands for bunker
price ($/ton); MFk represents main engines (s) daily fuel consumptions; AFk
represents auxiliary engine (s) daily fuel consumptions; S1k and S 0 k stand for the
operational and designed speed of vessel k.

Applying the speed reduction to CO2 reduction, authors compared with European
Commission Carbon Market Price, which means the lower the price, the less
sustainability of slow steaming will be. When there is no need to add more ships5, the
marginal cost can be less than the average 2008 price in carbon exchange markets.
However, when additional capacities needed into operation, the marginal cost is
always well above the market price for carbon whereas the cost effectiveness ranges
of $35-$200/ton CO2 for a speed reduction of 20%. (Corbett, Wang, & Winebrake,
2009, p. 597) The authors implied that the shipping industry would be a net buyer in a
universal cap-and-trade carbon exchange market if there will be extra capacities in the
service. This marginal cost effectiveness is the highest among the field where
Endresen, O., Skjong, R., Longva, T., Alvik, S. and M.S. Eide (2009) reported a cost
savings for a speed reduction from 25kn to 22kn is less than $50/ton for CO2
exchange price which is the criteria for shipping investors. (Eide, Endresen, Skjong,
Longva, & Alvik, 2009) Apparently, this study gives more credits on the ship’s
operator without concerning shipper/consignee’s interest. This potential loss of
customers’ loyalty is another cost to taken into consideration. Another concern is
about assessing on different routes. The data and information collected by authors are
among all the routes without analyzing on different service routes with different
5
Vessels carry more containers to meet constant container demands through increasing capacity factor or using
more efficient package system.
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profit-maximizing characteristics.

Reviewing the foregoing literatures, the major quantitative methods measuring the
sustainability of slow steaming is highly related to the bunker price or CO2 exchange
price, which for the shipping lines, the biggest part in their daily operation. However,
there are few researches taking the time impact on shippers/consignees interests into
consideration which could cause tremendous opportunity cost on shipping lines.

2.5 Summary

In this chapter, we reviewed relevant researches from three aspects, namely,
effectiveness of slow steaming, negative impact of slow steaming and economic
sustainability of slow steaming. From an objective perspective, this strategy relieved
more pressure for shipping lines under economic crisis and high fuel cost. The huge
cost saving both in environment and bunker attracts liner shipping companies to
establish this as a “win-win” strategy. (MAERSK, 2010) Nevertheless, shipper’s
interest is largely sacrificed since the longer transit time from slow steaming,
accompanying with additional inventory carrying cost, longer lead-time and
upgrading safety stock. The slow steaming is regarded to put “butterfly effect” on the
whole supply chain. (Marle, 2010)

In term of sustainability of slow steaming in long term, many scholars pointed that it
should be carefully examined subject to different benchmarks, normally, fuel price
related. Quantitative analysis is limited to the shipping line’s interests with less
considering different cargo value or trade route characteristics. Generally, it is a very
huge system taking all the related factors into consideration. The literature review
provides not only some qualitative review on this strategy, but more quantitative
analysis is more confirmed. So, in the next chapter, three major costs in slow steaming
will be presented with detailed analysis.
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Chapter 3 Economic Factors in Slow Steaming

3.1 Introduction

As widely accepted by main researches, the slow steaming strategy is effectively
coping with high fuel consumption. But fuel consumption shall not be the only
decisive criteria for slow steaming. In this chapter, three major factors in slow
steaming will be listed out and an algebra method to assess the significance of each
components upon total sustainability analysis.

3.2 Bunker Cost

3.2.1 Bunker Fuel Price Evolution
800
Bunker Price ($/tonne)

700

679.5

Growth Rate: 4%

600
500
400
300
200
100

194.5

0

Figure 2 - Monthly Bunker Price at Port of Rotterdam Evolution 2008-10 ($/tonne)
Source: Own presentation based on data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network (2011)
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Figure 2 depicts the up and down of the bunker fuel6 price at Port of Rotterdam
where is always considered as the cheapest bunkering port. In the pre-crisis era, the
price of 380 CST climbed all the way and finally peaked at $679.5/tonne. With a
sharp downwards, the fuel price dropped to the bottom which was around
$194.5/tonne within only three months with an impressive 70% decline! Moreover,
during the recession, the bunker price crept steadily eventually arrived to the
pre-crisis level with 4% average growth rate.

Volatility and up-trend were two characteristics of bunker price during the economic
crisis. The former adds more risks for shipping lines. Several shipping lines including
China Ocean Shipping Corporation (COSCO), Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) hedged
the bunker price fluctuation and charging Bunker Adjustment Factor (BAF). The latter,
has an upward effect on costs which becomes a thorny problem for shipping lines. In
the last couple of years, bunker price increased in line with the crude oil price.
(Vernimmen & Notteboom, 2009, p. 325) Obviously, shipping companies cannot
influence the crude oil price as well as the bunker price. The shipping industry’s
response to upcoming high bunker price is to control the fuel consumption.

3.2.2 Fuel Consumption

The actual fuel used by ship depends on her the speed and hull condition. As many
researches shown, there is a cubic law between vessel speed and fuel consumption
variation.
⎛V ⎞
FC ss = FCd × ⎜⎜ ss ⎟⎟
⎝ Vd ⎠

3

Where: FC ss = fuel consumption under slow steaming (tons/day)

FCd = designed fuel consumption
Vss = speed under slow steaming (knots = nautical miles/day)
6

380 CST grade – CST means the unit centistokes and related to the kinematic viscosity of the residual fuel
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(3.1)

V d = designed speed

In order to find effectiveness of speed reduction on fuel consumption, it is essential to
collect current containership designed speed and fuel consumption. We extracted fleet
information from Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Network within 2,001 observations
categorized into nine groups according to ship size. We limited vessels younger than
20 years for the age of vessel differing fuel consumption by 20%. (Stopford, 1997, p.
170) Table 1 show our estimations based on cubic law on different vessels for speed
varying from designed speed to actual speed and their corresponding fuel
consumptions.

Vessel Speed (knots)

25.00

250.00

24.00
200.00

23.00
22.00

150.00

21.00

100.00

20.00
50.00

19.00
18.00

Fuel Consumption (tons/day)

300.00

26.00

0.00

Mean Designed Speed

Fuel Consumption

Figure 3 - Relationship between Vessel Size and Speed/Fuel Consumption
Source: Own Presentation

Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between vessel size and speed/daily fuel
consumption. For vessels less than 7,000 TEU capacity, daily fuel consumption and
speed are in line with ship capacity. However, a turning point occurs in which larger
ships have lower speed. According to our observation and estimation, the average
designed speed of 7-8,000 TEU vessels is only 24.66 knots. More significantly,
10,000 TEU has almost the same speed as 5,000 TEU vessels. On the other hand, the
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fuel consumption is getting flat with growth of vessel size. The gap of fuel
consumption based on different categories is getting narrow since the fuel
consumption is also depending on age, machinery and hull condition. Obviously,
larger vessels came into operation in recent years, particularly, the 10,000 TEU class,
with an age of two years while the 2-3,000 TEU class approaches to their scrapped
point. This is largely due to the improving ship design technology and diesel engine.
Apart from the technique, the cost effectiveness largely relies on speed variation.

Daily Fuel Consumption (tonnes/day)
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Figure 4 - Effectiveness of Speed Reduction on Fuel Consumptions
Source: Own Presentation

Figure 4 depict the effectiveness of speed reduction of a 7,024 TEU, 2007 built fully
cellular containership7. The figure indicates that several knots dropping in speed leads
to a drastic decrease in fuel consumption. (Vernimmen & Notteboom, 2009, p. 327)
For instance, three knots (from 25 to 22 knots) reduction in speed gives rise to 65 tons
fuel saving per day for a 7,024 TEU containership. Given the current bunker price
haunting around $500/ton, which 65 tons bunker saving translates into daily cost
saving to $32,270. But the cost effectiveness will diminish, if the ship sails further
slower, from 22 to 19 knots, cost saving drops to $24,567/day. As long as bunker price
increases, lower speed brought more cost savings.
7

“Ever Safety”, owned and operated by Evergreen Marine Corporation
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Table 1 - Results of Observation and Estimation
2-3000

3-4000

4-5000

5-6000

6-7000

7-8000

8-9000

9-10000

10000+

Number of Vessel

288

288

574

303

193

43

189

57

58

Mean Size (TEU)

2,456

3,428

4,376

5,403

6,535

7,324

8,345

9,290

12,249

13

11

7

7

6

7

4

4

2

Mean Designed Speed

21.06

22.74

24.26

25.08

25.23

24.64

25.09

24.66

24.38

Fuel Consumption

77.65

109.76

147.59

191.40

229.09

234.93

251.33

248.13

258.39

Mean Age

Fuel Consumption (tons/day)8

Speed Variation (knots)
25

-

-

24

-

-

23

-

-

-

190

223

245

249

258

279

143

168

197

217

220

229

246

126

148

173

191

194

201

217

22

89

99

110

129

152

167

169

176

190

21

77

86

96

112

132

145

147

153

165

20

67

75

83

97

114

126

127

132

143

19

57

64

71

83

98

108

109

113

122

18

49

54

60

71

83

92

93

96

104

17

41

46

51

60

70

77

78

81

88

16

34

38

42

50

58

64

65

68

73

15

28

32

35

41

48

53

54

56

60

Source: Own calculation based on fleet statistics from Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Network (2011)

8

Estimation based on equation 3.1
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3.3 Operating Cost of Additional Capacities

3.3.1 Newbuildings in Containership Fleet

The primary reason for shipping lines to use slow steaming is to save fuel bill while
the “bonus” for them is to relieve the overcapacities pressure. Due to strong “appetite”
for newbuildings in 2006 and 2007, new capacities flooded into market during
recession. With slow steaming, extra vessels are required to fleet maintain a weekly
service. (Notteboom, 2006, p. 20) This perfectly settled shipowner’s trouble of
oversupply.

Table 2 - Forecast of Containership Fleet Growth
Vessel Capacities
(TEU)

2010

2011

2012

2013

884,798

1,486,708

2,240,418

2,924,314

7,500-9,999

2,262,471

2,498,644

2,687,204

3,096,932

5,100-7,499

2,637,656

2,853,297

3,009,343

3,070,095

4,000-5,099

3,074,686

3,232,212

3,436,004

3,522,144

3,000-3,999

1,098,580

1,139,543

1,190,304

1,256,396

2,000-2,999

1,821,452

1,854,864

1,888,905

1,937,021

1,500-1,999

987,871

1,007,845

1,026,029

1,032,957

1,000-1,499

831,438

865,023

889,343

894,729

500-999

591,517

603,359

609,617

609,617

100-499

87,390

87,128

87,128

87,128

14,277,859

15,628,623

17,064,295

18,431,333

10,000-15,500

Total
Source: Alphaliner (2011)

Future capacities into market absolutely determine the slow steaming. As Table 2
shown, Alphaliner predicted the containership fleet capacities in terms of TEU based
on orderbook as at 01 March 2011 and assumption of no ships being cancelled after
that date. In the next three years, global containership fleet will enter into the “mega”
era. At the end of 2013, categories of vessels larger than 4,000 TEU will all be around
three million TEUs slot capacities. Larger-than-10,000TEU class gives out an
impressive annual growth rate of 48.1% according to Alphaliner’s calculation. During
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the next three years, orderbook of larger than 10,000 TEU is twice as much as the
current fleet. On the other hand, smaller vessels (less than 1,000 TEU) will be almost
static or even declining.

More newbuildings entering market will somehow break the current balance between
supply and demand, especially in larger sectors. For speed reduction, it shall be going
further slower. Actually, several shipping lines adopted “extra slow steaming” (second
stage of slow steaming). But as discussed in section 3.2.2, the cost effectiveness in
fuel consumption will be less significant. With more new capacities into operation,
vessels go further slower, which makes shipping lines step into the third stage slow
steaming – super slow steaming that will reach the barrier due to additional vessels
and equipment. (Alphaliner, 2010)

3.3.2 Operating Cost (OPEX)

With new vessels introduced to string, shipping lines will face to pay extra OPEX.
Normally, operating costs are the ongoing expenses connected with the daily
operation of the vessel, plus periodic maintenance and repairs for day-to-day.
(Stopford, 1997, p. 160) OPEX is regarded as “essential” costs whether the vessel is
under operation or not. The principal components of OPEX are: manning (crewing);
insurance; repairs and maintenance (R&M); stores and supplies; management and
administration.

Among these five components, manning becomes the most critical for today’s
shipping industry. Many shipping companies reported difficulty in finding qualified
seafarers and wages are still increasing for experience officers. It is impossible to
operate a ship without a captain. Total manning cost may account for up to half of
OPEX with regard to crew deployment policy and the size of vessels. (Stopford, 1997,
p. 161) Figure 5 vividly shows the gap between supply and demand of officers in
shipping during past two decades. Demand for officers exceeded supply alongside in
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the whole 20 years while the future is getting worse. The fewer workers on board, the
higher the salary will be paid without considering crew deployment for new vessels.
Furthermore, with bigger ships, more crew members are required. Numbers for a
typical 2,000 TEU vessels are 15 while for 10,000 TEU are 20-22. (Drewry Shipping
Consultancy Ltd., 2010) Based on this, shipping lines will have no choice but to
obtain extra officers with higher wages which finally lift up the OPEX.
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Number of Officers

600,000
550,000
500,000
450,000
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Year
Officer Demand

Officer Supply

Figure 5 - Seafarers Supply/demand Imbalance
Source: BIMCO/ISF (1990-95), PAL/Drewry (2009-13)

3.4 Transit Inventory Cost

In transportation system, generally, shippers tend to be more/less willing to pay for a
faster/slower service depending on the cargo capital costs which varies from
commodity to commodity. (Ma, 2010, p. 42) Besides, trade structure also varies in
international scale. So, in this section, we will observe both cargo value and structure.

3.4.1Estimation on Containerisable Cargo Value

In the past two decades, global production and manufacture had been fueled by
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containerization. Unlike bulk commodities, containerized cargo are manufacturing
and consumer goods ranging from clothes to electronic devices. In order to determine
the value of cargo packed in one FEU, we observe 19 mostly traded containerized
cargo, accounting for 90% of container trade worldwide. Due to lacking in existing
data, we estimated average value of one 40ft container through annual value of cargo
(Asia exporting to North America) divided by corresponding transported quantities in

300,000
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700,000
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
-

$/FEU

250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
-

Average Cargo Value/FEU

FEUs/year

one year9.

Annual FEU Transported

Figure 6 - Average Value per FEU and Annual Quantities for Selected Containerisable Cargoes
Source: Own presentation based on various issues of Chinese Custom Statistics, UNCTAD, Journal of
Commerce

Some of our estimations are shown in Figure 6. Firstly, the average value varies
strongly in accordance to what is in the container. Among 18 types of cargo, “fashion
accessories or handbags” is the highest value with $526,915/FEU. However, one same
box of “furniture and parts of” values at $20,694, which accounts for only 4% of
“fashion products”. The reason is that the fashion product has a shorter life cycle or
higher economic/technical depreciation ratio. (Notteboom, 2006, p. 27) Secondly,
9

See detailed calculation in Appendix I
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Specialization of different countries gives rise to the international trade. With trade
agreement and policies among different partners, structure of transported cargo varies
from region to region.

We select top 5 cargo exported from Far East 10 and Sub Continent 11 to North
America. Figure 7 describe proportion of each top five cargo in terms of quantities
(FEUs). The gap between commodities exported from Far East to North America is
narrow. The biggest market share of exports is furniture, 33% while the smallest of
ones are toys and auto part, 13%. In contrast, freight flows from Sub Continent are not
as balanced as in Far East. Most exported merchandise is wearing apparel (clothing),
accounting for 66% compared to 2% of sporting goods and tires/tubes.

Two reasons could explain this phenomenon. Firstly, the degree of production
maturity in Far East is much higher than Sub Continent. Top five commodities traded
between Far East and North America is exactly top five containerisable cargo traded
between

Asia

and

North

America.

Most

cargoes

from

Far

East

are

semi-finished/finished products; while from Subcontinent are raw materials in
production stage, e.g., piece goods, fabric/yarns for clothing industry. Secondly, the
diversity in goods exported. From the exporting list from Far East to North America,
almost all the daily consumer goods could be found, like electronic goods, furniture
and wearing apparel. However, 96% of top five commodities are just for ONE
industry – clothing. (23% of piece goods + 66% of wearing apparel + 7% of
fabrics/yarns/threads)

Based on above, shippers have different requirements and preference on velocity of
transportation depending on cargo types and exporting countries. Consequently, the
assessment of slow steaming is substantially based on different service routes.

10

Countries include Japan, Korea (South), China (Hong Kong, Taiwan), Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand,
Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam.
11
Countries include Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh
30

3.5 Summary

In this chapter, we list out three major economic factors related to vessels speed.
Firstly, bunker costs. With no influence in oil market, the only way shipping lines
could deal with considerable fuel costs is to taking control over fuel consumption.
Based on cubic law, we calculate the fuel consumption of different vessels in terms of
sizes. Secondly, operating costs. It is the essential costs for whether the vessels being
assigned to transportation or not. The biggest part of operating costs is manning which
will increase in the foreseeable future. Thirdly, the transit inventory costs. This is the
cost that largely neglected by shipping lines when considering speed reduction. The
value for one FEU is much depended on what inside the container. And due to the
trade pattern and different production level in countries, the average value for one
loaded container will be much different on different exporting countries.

Based on these three costs, in next chapter, we will do a cost/comparison study by
setting several parameter constant aiming to observe how cargo price affecting the
sustainability of slow steaming.

31

Chapter 4 Sustainability of Slow Steaming in Liner Shipping
4.1 Introduction

After identifying all the speed-related costs in liner shipping, slow steaming analysis
is just based on cost comparison from fast to slow transportation. In this chapter,
algebra of sustainability assessment will be first established followed by application
to different services routes on Asia/North America trade.

4.2 Algebra of Sustainability Assessment

Hypothetically, a fleet of N identical containerships go back and forth between port A
and B between which the distance is known as LAB (nm). For simplicity, N ships are
fully loaded from A to B and completely empty coming back.12 The designed speed
of ship equals to Vd (knots) while, under slow steaming, it goes down to Vs (knots).
The annual operating cost for each ship is O.C. ($/year) and annual operating days for
each ship is 350 days.

Round voyage time: T = 2× L AB / Vd

(4.1)

Number of Round voyage per year: n = 350 / T

(4.2)

Number of vessel in string: N = T / 7

(4.3)

Not included in O.C. are bunker costs and transit inventory based on our discussion in
Chapter 3. Firstly, the bunker cost. The actual daily fuel consumption, F.C.
12

The assumption is very close to trade from Far East to North Europe or North America
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(tonne/day), is calculated based on fuel consumption from ship’s designed speed
according to cubic law. Concerning with bunker price Pb ($/tonne), we primarily set it
as a constant during that voyage even though it’s time-wise strongly fluctuated.
Secondly, standing at a logistic view, reducing speed will consequently drive more

inventory cost due to the late delivery. The daily inventory cost for a ship is assumed
equal to I.C., which is determined by average retail price of containerisable cargo, Pc
($/TEU); discounted rates, R, as capital costs for goods in transit and vessel capacities,
W (TEU). In order to simplify the scenario, the inventory cost occurs on loading,
transiting (loaded) and discharge, excluding time spent in port and inland
transportation. (Psaraftis & Kontovas, 2009)

Based on above, annual cost for a single vessel under initial speed is,

( F .C. × Pb + Pc ×

R
× W ) × 350 + O.C.
365

(4.4)

Then for N containerships, total fleet costs will be,
R
⎡
⎤
T .F .C.d = ⎢( F .C. × Pb + Pc ×
× W ) × 350 + O.C.⎥ × N
365
⎣
⎦

(4.5)

When all N containerships sail from Vd to Vs, to maintain a weekly service
(Notteboom, 2006), more ships have to be into fleet, assuming Δ N ships is as same
as N ships in capacities.
ΔN = ΔT

(4.6)

7

Then, under slow steaming, total fleet annual cost will change to:
⎡
⎛V
T .F .C s = ⎢( F .C. × ⎜⎜ s
⎢⎣
⎝ Vd

3
⎤
⎞
R
⎟⎟ × Pb + Pc ×
× W ) × 350 + O.C.⎥ × (N + ΔN )
365
⎥⎦
⎠

(4.7)

Clearly, whether slow steaming is sustainable depends on cost changes. As long as
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T.F.C.s less than T.F.C.d, then reductions make sense. So, ΔT .F .C.d →s ≥ 0
benchmarks the break-even point. As in our hypotheses, both bunker price and
operating cost during one year remain constant; the inventory cost determines
threshold of sustainability.
ΔT .F .C d →s

⎡
⎛V
= F .C. × D × Pb × ⎢ N − ⎜⎜ s
⎢⎣
⎝ Vd

3
⎤
⎞
R
⎟⎟ × ( N + ΔN )⎥ + Pc ×
× W × D × ΔN + O.C. × ΔN ≥ 0
365
⎥⎦
⎠
(4.8)

3
⎤
⎡
⎛ Vs ⎞
F .C. × 350 × Pb × ⎢ N − ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ × ( N + ΔN )⎥ − O.C. × ΔN
⎥⎦
⎢⎣
⎝ Vd ⎠

Pc ≤

R ×W

ΔN × 350

(4.9)
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The slow steaming is only viable when cargo price does not exceed Pc, which means
saving bunker bill while, simultaneously not causing additional inventory costs. One
may consider that even though accounting in inventory cost, the threshold would be
large enough. But it is not necessarily true. (Psaraftis & Kontovas, 2009)

In order to make our approach more clear, two scenarios are used to demonstrate it.
Assuming one 8,000TEU vessel, typically deployed on Far East – Europe (via Suez
Canal) trade route, goes from Shanghai to Rotterdam, a distance of 10,392 nm. The
base speed for her is Vd=25 knots and the fuel consumption at which is 245
tonnes/day, then concerning the bunker price of Pb = $600/tonne, which is during a
period of high price. If we decide to sail vessel under lower speeds, 80% and 70% of
base speed Vs1=20, Vs2=18, knots. The annual operating cost for one 8,000 TEU
vessel is $4,104,060. (Drewry Shipping Consultancy Ltd., 2010) And we use 10% as
discount rate which is the minimum standard for any assets or capital. Then we will
have:
Table 3 - Results of Case Study

25 to 20 knots
v (knots)

25

20

Voyage Time (days)

34.43

43.04
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Round Voyages/year (#)

10

8

Number of Vessel (#)

5

6

Fuel Consumption (tonnes/day)

245

125

Bunker Price ($/tonne)

600

600

Daily Bunker Cost($/day)

147,000

75,264

BC/year ($/year)

51,450,000

26,342,400

Daily Inventory Cost ($/day)

199,954

199,954

IC/Year ($/year)

69,983,940

69,983,940

OPEX/year ($/year)

4,104,060

4,104,060

Total. Cost/ship/year ($/year)

125,538,000

100,430,400

Total Fleet Cost/year ($/year)

617,467,620

617,467,620

Break-Even Point

-

for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

182,458

25 to 18 knots
v (knots)

25

18

Voyage Time (days)

34.43

47.82

Round Voyages/year (#)

10

7

Number of Vessel (#)

5

7

Fuel Consumption (tonnes/day)

245

91

Bunker Price ($/tonne)

600

600

Daily Bunker Cost($/day)

147,000

54,867

BC/year ($/year)

51,450,000

19,203,610

Daily Inventory Cost ($/day)

170,319

170,319

IC/Year ($/year)

59,611,620

59,611,620

OPEX/year ($/year)

4,104,060

4,104,060

Total Cost/ship/year

115,165,680

82,919,290

Total Fleet Cost/Year

566,450,623

566,450,623

Break-Even Point

-

for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

155,416

Source: Own calculation

The result of case study clearly shows that with going further slow, the threshold
for average cargo price breakeven point is getting limited. This means shipping

lines starting to deteriorate more shippers’ interests in lower speed. Consequently,
slow steaming will no longer be profitable. Of course, the break-even point may yield
to different assumptions. For longer voyage distance, the break-even point is much
higher because bunker cost saving is significant in long haul. Hence, evaluating the
sustainability of slow steaming is much depended on different trade routes.
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4.3 Application of Sustainability Analysis on Asia/America Trade Route

In this section, we will apply our sustainability assessment to real life data of
Asia/North America trade in the period of 2008 to 2010 during which slow steaming
started. In the last sub-section, the average value of containerisable cargo is used to
determine the sustainability of slow steaming for each liner services.

4.3.1 Slow Steaming on Asia/America Trade Route 2008- 2010

According to Drewry Quarterly Container Forecast, there are 80 liner services in 2008
and 78 in 2010 offered by 23 shipping lines or strategic alliances on Asia/North
America trade. For the present paper, we divide liner services into three categories in
accordance to destinations, Far East/East Coast of North America, Far East/West
Coast of North America and Far East/Mixed13 services.

Table 4 - Comparison of Liner Services on Far East/North America Trade, 2008-10
Number of Services (#)

Average Size of Vessels (TEU)

2008

2010

2008

2010

Far East/ECNA

19

9

4,411

5,339

Far East/WCNA

55

55

3,749

5,210

Far East/Mixed

6

14

4,601

5,187

Source: Own calculation based on Drewry Container Forecaster (2010)

As Table 4 indicates, in the end of 2008, 19 services are offered on Far East/ECNA
while in 2010 shrinks down to 9. Number of services on Far East/WCNA remains the
same in two years. However, on Far East/Mixed route, 8 additional services are added
during 2008-10. Concerning with the size of vessels deployed, all three sectors
upgrade to 5,000+ TEU class. Particularly, 5,000 TEU class is the biggest ship that
allowed transiting current Panama Canal when routing on Far East/ECNA.
Nevertheless, the variation of ship size is strong among three sectors. In 2010, For Far
East/ECNA, the smallest and the biggest one are 4,024 TEU and 6,812 TEU. The
13

Port of calls in North America are both in west and east coasts, some are in the gulf region.
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sam
me, as show
wn in Figurre 8, in 20008, 28 out of 55 services are beeing run wiith 5
vesssels while in
i 2010, a number
n
of shipping
s
lin
nes start to add one orr two additiional
vesssel to the string whichh prompt seervices under “6 vesseels” and “7 vessels”. In
n an
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num
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(Verrnimmen & Notteboom
m, 2009, p. 333)
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Table 5 - Slow Steeaming on Asiia/America Trrade, 2010
Number

%

N
Number

%

Averaage Size

of

service

of

vessels
v

of Vessel under Slow

Service

slow

Vessels

slow

ng(TEUs)
Steamin

steeaming

steaming
Far East/ECNA

9

67%

81

68%

4,,841

Far East/WCNA
A

55

35%

389

36%

5,,809

Farr East/Mixed

14

31%

143

35%

5,,323

Souurce: Drewry Container Forrecaster (20088, 2009, 2010))
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Table 5 shows the status of slow steaming on Asia/North America Trade regarding to
longer transit time between ports of call. In Far East/ECNA, there are 6 services

(9services × 67%) and 55 vessels (81vessels × 68%) are under slow steaming, which
is the highest among three sectors. From the perspective of size of vessel, on Far
East/WCNA and Mixed, bigger vessels are intended to sail slower compared to Far
East/ECNA, with the average size of 5,809 TEU and 5,323 TEU. Obviously, a large
number of liner services adopt slow steaming during recession. In next section, we
will verify the sustainability of each service under slow steaming through the
breakeven point for cargo value.

4.3.2 Breakeven Point for Cargo Value of Far East/N.A. Liner Service

Table 6 - Break Even Point of Cargo Price on AEX
AEX/ECNA

Service Code/Sector
Distance (nm)

25,068

Average Capacities (TEU)

5,712
16

Port of Calls
Speed Variation (knots)

26

22

Voyage Time (days)

56

63

Days @ Sea

40

47

Number of Vessel (#)

8

9

BC/year ($/year)

28,500,000

20,210,000

IC/Year ($/year)

30,291,550

31,637,841

OC/year ($/year)

3,701,830

3,701,830

Total Cost/ship/year

62,493,380

55,549,671

Fleet Cost/Year

499,947,040

499,947,040

-

154,852

Break-Even Point
for Cargo Price ($/FEU)
Source: Own Calculation

Note: The round voyage distance is based on “port to port distance” on www. searates.com.

We calculate the breakeven point for cargo value on 24 services currently under slow
steaming on Far East/N.A. through the designed the model in previous section (4.2).
Table 6 is one of our estimations. Firstly, the round voyage distance for AEX is
25,068 nautical miles with 16 ports of call alongside. The average size of ships
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deployed is 5,712 TEU. In the year 2008, the voyage time is 56 days, in order to
determine time at sea, we simply assume that each vessel spends one day in each port
of call. (Vernimmen & Notteboom, 2009, p. 333) For example, in 2008, each vessel
spends 40 days at sea per round voyage. Then we could get the vessel speed variation
from 26 knots to 22 knot in 2008 to 2010. According to our estimation on daily fuel
consumption (see, table 1), the daily bunker consumption decreases from 190
tonnes/day to 115 tonnes/day. The bunker price is set to be $600/tonne which is very
close to current situation. Then, based on equation (4.9), the breakeven point of value
for one FEU will be $154,852, which is higher than average value for one FEU
exporting from Far East to North America, $116,175 as we estimated in section 3.4.1.
So, slow steaming could be applied on AEX in future since shipping carrier does not
sacrifice shippers’ interest.

4.3.3 Assessment of Sustainability Slow Steaming on Far East/North America Trade

Then, we calculate the breakeven point for all the services under slow steaming on
Far East/North America Trade route.14 Table 7 shows the result.

Table 7 - Breakeven Point for Each Service on Far East/North America Trade
Break-Even Point for Cargo Price ($/FEU)
Service Code

Carriers
Far East/ECNA

AEX

154,582

Grand Alliance

NCE

63,233

Grand Alliance

SZX

170,691

New World Alliance

AWE1/AWH

156,958

CKYH

AWE3/AWY

179,219

CKYH

AWE5/AWN

76,227

CKYH

Far East/WCNA

14

SSX

86,232

Grand Alliance

SCX

119,958

Grand Alliance

See Appendix II for detailed calculations
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PN
NX

18,310

Grand Alliannce/ZIM

PS
S2

174,573

New World Alliance

SA
AX

187,856

New World Alliance

PSX

174,737

New World Alliance

PC
CE

54,163

New World Alliance

PSW
W1

30,547

CKYH
H

PSX

89,637

CKYH
H

CA
AX

71,863

CKYH
H

UA
AM

108,473

Evergreeen

PR
RX

77,831

MSC/CMA
A CGM

TP2/EA
AGLE

142,582

M
Maersk/CMA
C
CGM VSA

TP8/NOX/B
Bohai Rim

73,317

M
Maersk/CMA
C
CGM VSA

F East/Mixeed
Far
TP33-9

47,966

M
Maersk/CMA
C
CGM VSA

APX/C
CNY

91,656

New World Alliance

PEX
X3

99,740

CMA CGM

PEX2/PAC
CAR/AAE

59,760

CMA CGM/CS
SAV/CSCL

Sourrce: Own calcuulation
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Table 8 - Estimation of “Actual” Number of Services under Slow Steaming
Number of Services
under Slow Steaming
Current

Estimation

Far East/ECNA

6

4

Far East/WCNA

14

Far East/Mixed

4

%

Number of
Service

Current

Estimation

9

67%

44%

5

55

25%

9%

0

14

31%

0%

41%

18%

Average
Source: own calculation

sacrificing shippers’ interest. Together with no services is suitable for adopting slow
steaming in Far East/Mixed service; there could be 18% of total services using slow
steaming whereas according to various market reports and research papers, around 41%
of services of Far East/North America are under slow steaming.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter, we firstly establish a cargo price threshold for assessing the feasibility
and sustainability of slow steaming. Secondly, by using a case study from
“Shanghai-Rotterdam”, we find that with lower speed, shipping lines could only take
low value cargo leading to lower profits. Finally, the application to the real life data
on Far East/North America trade route proves that a large number of liner services
currently under slow steaming have caused shippers more inventory costs during
transit with its breakeven point for cargo price not passing the average value
containerisable cargo exporting from Far East.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions
Organizations involved in container trade are facing great pressure from increasing oil
prices and oversupply market pattern. Based on two reasons, shipping lines have no
choice but to use slow steaming as a “self-rescue” strategy for covering great loss.
The paper reveals the sustainability of this strategy from an overall cost analysis.

5.1 Main Findings

Firstly, today, interests of shippers on container trade is largely deteriorated by slow
steaming for bearing more capital tied-up in transit. A large proportion of cargoes
exported from Far East to North America are involved in manufacture process, with
longer transit time, shippers will be forced to raise safety stock to maintain the same
production level. Just as the estimation by Vernimmen et al. (2007) that 0.5 days
increasing in transit time will cause shipper 2 billion euro additional annual storage
cost in manufacturing process. (Vernimmen, Dullaert, & Engelen, 2007, pp. 207-209)
The results also reflect rising complaints from shipper for slow steaming with various
presses on this issue. US shippers have criticized slow steaming as a “carrier-driven”
strategy which has hit supply chain. Moreover, the Federal Maritime Commission
started to examine whether the overall impact on supply chain. Because slow
steaming has driven some shippers to use “near-sourcing” which appears in higher
fashion retailer, starting importing valuable cargo from Europe rather than Far East.

Secondly, the sustainability analysis of slow steaming is rational when shipping lines
start to taking inventory costs into account. Through slow steaming, shipping lines
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seem to save substantial cost from fuel consumption reduction. But it is based on their
ignorance of inventory costs. If inventory cost accounts for one component of voyage
cost, the total cost changes is less significant. Shipping lines shall by no means
neglect shippers’ interest in today’s integrated transportation chain. Imagine when the
vessels sail at extremely low speed, it will provoke shippers stop choosing maritime
transportation as its catastrophic economic damage to their goods.

Thirdly, slow steaming could be sustainable under better liner services designations.
Indeed, shipping lines many argue about higher fuel price, but slow steaming not the
only choice for dealing with it. A better alternative is designation of liner service.
From our estimation for three Far East/North America sectors, for longer voyages,
cancellation of port of calls could substantially uplift the breakeven point which will
has a more positive effect in reducing bunker costs and not interfering shippers’
interests.

5.2 Limitations of Research

Firstly, when assessing the sustainability of slow steaming, we simply set the bunker
price and operating cost constant. However, these two costs vary regarding to
different scenarios. For bunker price, apart from its time-wise fluctuation, the
bunkering place is also a very critical part. Secondly, in collecting value of
containerisable cargo, we just include the dry cargo container for lack of information
for reefer cargoes which is more sensitive to transit time. Thirdly, the paper just
analyzes the impact of slow steaming for shipper on the leg of water transportation.
As many literature shown, longer time for shipper waiting will magnify on their
further supply chain management.

Backing to question raised at the very beginning of the paper, “is slow steaming a
transient fashion or strategy here to say?” It much depends on shipping lines
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reactions to today’s liner shipping market. Firstly, major shipping lines started another
round of newbuilding orders to expand their market share. The year 2013 will witness
the biggest number of containership deliveries. Slow steaming has absorbed large
excess tonnage and almost reaches its barrier. When new capacities floods into the
market, oversupply will be more critical than what we have seen today. Secondly,
thanks to slow steaming, environmental performance is much improved during 2008
to 2010. Under no circumstance should green shipping become a hypocrisy hiding
“green” ($) bottom line. (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2011) When the international trade
is recovering and demand for transportation is rising, every shipping line would like
to offer a fast service catching as much as shipments they can. At that time, a low
carbon footprint will be nothing to them.

Based on major conclusions we have, slow steaming is just an un-optimal
optimization which could be effective for both shipping lines and shippers combined
with synchronous re-design of liner services.

46

Bibliography
Alphaliner. (2010, Feburary). Extra Slow Steaming rise but could soon reach limit.
Alphaliner Weekly Newsletter .
AXS-Alphaliner. (2010). Alphaliner weekly newsletter. Retrieved January 5, 2011,
from www.alphaliner.com.
Barrass, C. (2004). Ship Design and Performance for Masters and Mates. Elsevier.
Bowerso, D. J., & Closs, D. J. (1996). Logistics Management, the integrated supply
chain process. McGraw-Hill Book Co.
BunkerSpot. (2010, April). Go Slow? Retrieved February 9, 2011, from
www.bunkerspot.com: www.bunkerspot.com
Burke, D. A., Brown, K. N., Tarim, S. A., & Hurch, B. (2008). Learning Market
Prices in Real-Time Supply Chain Management. Computers &Operations
Research , 35, pp. 3456-3478.
Cadarso, M.-A., Lopez, L.-A., Gomez, N., & Tobarra, M.-A. (2011). CO2 emissions
of international freight transport and offshoring: Measurement and allocation.
Ecological Economics , pp. 1682-1694.
Cariou, P. (2011). Is Slow Steaming a Sustainable Means of Reducing CO2 Emissions
from Container Shipping. Transport. Res.Part D .
Clean Shipping Coalition. (2010). Speed Reduction - the key to the fast and efficient
reduction of greenhouse gas emission from ships. Maritime Environment Protection
(pp. 1-4). London: International Maritime Organization.
Containerisation International. (2009, November). CI-Online. Retrieved June 7, 2010,
from www.ci-online.co.uk.
Corbett, J. J., Wang, H. F., & Winebrake, J. J. (2009). The Effectiveness and Costs of
Speed Reducitons on Emissions from International Shipping. Transport.Res.Part
D , 14, pp. 593-598.
Drewry Shipping Consultancy. (2010, January). Container Forecaster. Slow steaming .
Drewry Shipping Consultancy Ltd. (2010). Ship Operating Cost. London, UK:
Drewry Publishing.
47

Eefesen, T., & Cerup-Simonsen, B. (2010). Speed, carbon emissions and supply chain
in container shipping. on emissions and supply chain in container shipping. In:
Proceedings of the International Association of. Lisbon.
Eide, M. S., Endresen, O., Skjong, R., Longva, T., & Alvik, S. (2009, August).
Cost-effectinvess assessment of CO2 reducing measures in shipping. Maritime
Policy and Management , 36 (4), pp. 367-384.
Faber, J., Freund, M., Kopke, M., & Nelissen, D. (2010). Going slow to reduce
emissions – can the current surplus of maritime transport capacity be turned into
an opportunity to reduce GHG emissions? London: Marine Environment Protection
Committe.
Gerard, L. (2010, September 12). Slow steaming and low surplur - CMA CGM.
Retrieved
February
15,
2011,
from
http://www.iumi2010.com/pdf/conference/Slow_steaming_and_low_sulfur_L_GE
RARD.pdf
International Maritime Organization. (2008). Green-House Gas - Working Group
1/3/1:submitted by INTERTANKO (MEPC 58/4/3). London: INTERTANKO.
International Maritime Organization. (2008). Green-House Gas - Working Group
1/3/1:submitted by INTERTANKO. London: MEPC 58/4/3.
KontovasA.Christos, PsaraftisN.Harilaos, & KakalisM.P.Nikolaos. (2009). Speed
reduction as an emissions reduction measure for fast ships. 10th International
Conference on Fast Sea Transportation. Athens, Greece: FAST 2009.
Langen, P. W. (1999, October). Time Centrality in Transport. Maritime Economics
and Logistics .
Lumsden, K. (2007). Fundamentals of Logistics. Lund,Sweden: Studentlitteratur.
Ma, S. (2010). Maritime Economics. Unpbulised lecture handout, World Maritime
Univerisity, Malmo, Sweden.
MAERSK. (2010, January 9). Slow steaming is here to stay. Retrieved January 25,
2011,
from
Maersk:
http://www.maersk.com/AboutMaersk/News/Pages/20100901-145240.aspx
Marle, G. V. (2010, November 30). Shippers say slow steaming has no benefits.
Lloyd's List .
Meade, R. (2010, December 6). Cancun proporsals unfair to shipping. Lloyd's List .
48

Notteboom, T. (2008). Bundling of freight flows and hinterland network
developments. In R. Konings, H. Priemus, & P. Nijkamp, The future of intermodal
freight transport operations technology, design and implementation (pp. 66-88).
Cheltenham,UK: Edward Elgar Pub.
Notteboom, T. (2004, June). Container Shipping And Ports: An Overview. Reviews of
Network Economics .
Notteboom, T. (2006). The Time Factor in Liner Shipping Services. Maritime
Economics and Logistics , pp. 19-39.
Notteboom, T., & Cariou, P. (2009). The effect of high fuel costs on liner service
configuration in container shipping: Is it cost recovery and revenu-making. IAME
2009 Conference. Copenhagen: International Association of Maritime Economists.
Notteboom, T., & Rodrigue, J. P. (2008, 10). Containerisation,Box Logistics and
Global Supply Chains The Integration of Ports and Liner Shipping Networks.
Maritime Economics and Logistics , pp. 152-174.
Notteboom, T., & Rodrigue, J.-P. (2010). Economic Cycles and the Organizational
and Geographical Attributes of Global Value Chains: Is the Pendulum Chaning
Directions? Montreal, Canada.
Notteboom, T., & Rodrigue, J.-P. (2011). The Next Box Wave - Can Containerisation
Reinvent Itself? TOC,Europe . Antwerp,Belgium.
Oriental Overseas (International) Limited . (2009). Annual Report.
Psarafits, H., & Kontovas, C. (2009). CO2 emission statistics for the world
commercial fleet. WMU Journal of Martiime Affairs , 8, pp. 1-25.
Psaraftis, H. N., & Kontovas, C. A. (2009). Ship emissions:logistics and other
tradeoffs. Athens,Greece: Unpubished thesis of National Technical University of
Athens.
Psaraftis, H., & Kontovas, C. (2010). Reduction of Emissions Along the Intermodal
Container Chain. IAME 2010 Conference. Lisbon,Portugal: International
Association of Maritime Economists (IAME).
Stemmler, L. (2008). The value of time in container shipping. In C. Heideloff, & T.
Pawlik, Handbook of Container Shipping Management (pp. 45-58).
Bremen,Germany: Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics.
Stopford, M. (1997). Maritime Economics. New York: Routege.
49

Tersine, R. J. (1982). Principles of inventory and material management. New York.
Thomas, R. W., Esper, T. L., & Stank, T. P. (2010, 4). Testing the Negative Effects of
Time Pressure in Retail Supply Chain Relationships. Journal of Retailing , 86, pp.
386-400.
UNCTAD. (2010). Maritime Review of 2010. Geneva, NewYork: UNCTAD.
Veldman, J. S., & Buckmann, H. E. (2003). A Model on Container Port Compeitition:
An Application for the West European Container Hub-Ports. Maritime Economics
and Logistics , pp. 3-22.
Vernimmen, B., & Notteboom, T. (2009). The effect of high fuel costs on liner service
configuration in container shipping. Journal of Transport Geography , 17, pp.
325-337.
Vernimmen, B., Dullaert, W., & Engelen, S. (2007, 9). Schedule Unreliability in Liner
Shipping Origins and Consequences for the Hinterland Supply Chain. Maritime
Economics and Logistics , pp. 193-213.

50

Appendix I – Average Value for Containerisable Cargo (Far East –
North America)
Product Name

$/Year

FEUs/Year

$/FEU

Chemical products

20,389,400,004

54,476

374,282

Tires/Tubes

4,858,449,068

118,038

41,160

Wood manufacture

1,194,433,601

58,319

20,481

Paper Products

2,632,116,282

103,686

25,385

Fabric/Yarns/Threads

8,581,622,958

53,561

160,221

Iron/steel Products

4,794,181,744

56,316

85,130

Metal Product

14,392,329,207

50,654

284,130

Industrial machinery and parts

16,726,001,755

102,666

162,917

Computers/Business Machines

6,304,123,796

133,219

47,322

E-Products

48,067,521,004

409,311

117,435

Auto Parts/Ckd

12,320,989,825

180,219

68,367

Lighting/Fixtures/Bulbs

2,433,581,626

94,539

25,742

Furniture and parts thereof

13,886,463,486

671,052

20,694

Fashion Accessories/Handbags

43,326,089,419

82,226

526,915

Footwear

12,460,419,627

188,141

66,229

Sporting Goods

5,973,448,808

112,621

53,040

Plastic Mgfs/Goods

6,481,273,284

184,464

35,136

Toys

15,422,104,679

225,833

68,290

Non-electric Tools

2,071,056,000

84,737

24,441

Source: Chinese Custom Statistics, UNCTAD, Journal of Commerce

600,000

Average Value per FEU: $116,175

500,000
400,000
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Appendix II - Breakeven Point for Cargo Price for Far East/North America Trade Routes

Far East/East Coast of North America (6)
Service Code

AEX

NCE

SZX

Distance (nm)

25,068

21,878

23,225

Average Capacities (TEU)

5,712

4,922

5,006

16

8

11

Port of Calls
Speed Variation (knots)

26

22

19

17

22

19

Voyage Time (days)

56

63

56

63

56

63

Days @ Sea

40

47

48

55

45

52

Number of Vessel (#)

9

10

8

9

8

9

BC/year ($/year)

28,500,000

20,210,000

12,780,000

9,350,000

21,768,750

14,386,667

IC/Year ($/year)

35,098,733

36,658,677

12,790,427

13,027,287

32,920,851

33,814,997

OPEX/year ($/year)

3,701,830

3,701,830

3,167,835

3,167,835

3,701,830

3,701,830

Total Cost/ship/year

67,300,563

60,570,507

28,738,262

25,545,122

58,391,431

51,903,494

Fleet Cost/Year

605,705,068

605,705,068

229,906,097

229,906,097

467,131,447

467,131,447

-

179,426

-

63,233

-

170,691

Break-Even Point
for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

Service Code

AWE1/AWH

AWE3/AWY

AWE5/AWN

Distance (nm)

22,081

23,609

22,215

52

Average Capacities (TEU)
Port of Calls

4,024

4,198

4,083

10

8

8

Speed Variation (knots)

20

17

20

18

19

17

Voyage Time (days)

56

63

56

63

56

63

Days @ Sea

46

53

48

55

48

55

Number of Vessel (#)

8

9

8

9

8

9

BC/year ($/year)

14,317,500

9,010,000

17,280,000

11,000,000

12,780,000

9,350,000

IC/Year ($/year)

24,874,636

25,475,472

30,918,999

31,491,573

12,790,427

13,027,287

OPEX/year ($/year)

3,167,835

3,167,835

3,167,835

3,167,835

3,167,835

3,167,835

Total Cost/ship/year

42,359,971

37,653,307

51,366,834

45,659,408

28,738,262

25,545,122

Fleet Cost/Year

338,879,764

338,879,764

410,934,669

410,934,669

229,906,097

229,906,097

-

156,958

-

179,219

-

76,227

Break-Even Point
for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

Far East/West Coast of North America (14)
Service Code

SSX

SCX

PNX

Distance (nm)

13,195

17,117

15,425

Average Capacities (TEU)

8,063

6,508

8,342

9

15

12

Port of Calls
Speed Variation (knots)

21

17

25

17

21

19

Voyage Time (days)

35

42

49

56

42

49

Days @ Sea

26

33

28

41

30

37

Number of Vessel (#)

5

6

7

8

6

7

53

BC/year ($/year)

22,932,000

12,870,000

22,800,000

10,762,500

22,050,000

17,284,286

IC/Year ($/year)

24,763,841

26,192,524

21,388,648

27,404,205

5,230,789

5,529,692

OPEX/year ($/year)

4,104,060

4,104,060

3,986,895

3,986,895

3,986,895

3,986,895

Total Cost/ship/year

51,799,901

43,166,584

48,175,543

42,153,600

31,267,684

26,800,872

Fleet Cost/Year

258,999,506

258,999,506

337,228,799

337,228,799

187,606,106

187,606,106

-

86,232

-

119,958

-

18,310

Break-Even Point
for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

Service Code

PS2

SAX

PSX(New World Alliance)

Distance (nm)

15,867

15,788

15,830

Average Capacities (TEU)

5,780

6,622

6,292

13

8

11

Port of Calls
Speed Variation (knots)

23

18

19

16

21

17

Voyage Time (days)

42

49

42

49

42

49

Days @ Sea

29

36

34

41

31

38

Number of Vessel (#)

6

7

6

7

6

7

BC/year ($/year)

21,460,000

10,954,286

25,160,000

12,475,714

22,940,000

11,562,857

IC/Year ($/year)

33,403,975

35,543,145

48,282,514

49,905,455

38,907,292

40,879,551

OPEX/year ($/year)

3,701,830

3,701,830

3,986,895

3,986,895

3,986,895

3,986,895

Total Cost/ship/year

58,565,805

50,199,261

77,429,409

66,368,064

65,834,187

56,429,303

Fleet Cost/Year

351,394,827

351,394,827

464,576,451

464,576,451

395,005,121

395,005,121

-

174,573

-

187,856

-

174,737

Break-Even Point
for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

54

Service Code

PCE

PSW1

PSX(CKYH)

Distance (nm)

15,877

13,377

13,167

Average Capacities (TEU)

4,591

4,613

7,643

10

10

9

Port of Calls
Speed Variation (knots)

26

21

22

17

21

17

Voyage Time (days)

35

42

35

42

35

42

Days @ Sea

25

32

25

32

26

33

Number of Vessel (#)

5

6

5

6

5

6

BC/year ($/year)

21,450,000

15,360,000

16,500,000

8,160,000

22,620,000

12,705,000

IC/Year ($/year)

8,515,832

9,083,554

4,825,832

9,083,554

24,400,606

25,808,334

OPEX/year ($/year)

3,167,835

3,167,835

3,167,835

3,167,835

4,023,030

4,023,030

Total Cost/ship/year

33,133,667

27,611,389

24,493,667

20,411,389

51,043,636

42,536,364

Fleet Cost/Year

165,668,336

165,668,336

122,468,336

122,468,336

255,218,181

255,218,181

-

54,163

-

30,547

-

89,637

Break-Even Point
for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

Service Code

CAX

UAM

PRX

Distance (nm)

13,975

28,761

12,848

Average Capacities (TEU)

5,482

5,570

8,242

9

30

7

Port of Calls
Speed Variation (knots)

31

22

20

18

19

15

Voyage Time (days)

28

35

91

98

35

42

Days @ Sea

19

26

61

68

28

35

55

Number of Vessel (#)

4

5

13

14

5

6

BC/year ($/year)

20,662,500

12,012,000

13,654,615

10,345,714

18,312,000

9,450,000

IC/Year ($/year)

12,816,972

14,031,212

19,418,224

20,100,363

24,604,752

25,629,950

OPEX/year ($/year)

3,701,830

3,701,830

3,701,830

3,701,830

4,104,060

4,104,060

Total Cost/ship/year

37,181,302

29,745,042

36,774,669

34,147,907

47,020,812

39,184,010

Fleet Cost/Year

148,725,210

148,725,210

478,070,700

478,070,700

235,104,060

235,104,060

-

71,863

-

108,473

-

77,831

Break-Even Point
for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

Service Code

TP2/EAGLE

TP8/NOX/BR

Distance (nm)

13,382

12,556

Average Capacities (TEU)

7,043

8,280

8

8

Port of Calls
Speed Variation (knots)

21

16

19

15

Voyage Time (days)

35

42

35

42

Days @ Sea

27

34

27

34

Number of Vessel (#)

5

6

5

6

BC/year ($/year)

23,490,000

10,880,000

17,658,000

9,180,000

IC/Year ($/year)

37,141,948

38,976,119

22,453,154

23,561,951

OPEX/year ($/year)

4,023,030

4,023,030

4,104,060

4,104,060

Total Cost/ship/year

64,654,978

53,879,149

44,215,214

36,846,011

Fleet Cost/Year

323,274,891

323,274,891

221,076,069

221,076,069

-

142,582

-

73,317

Break-Even Point
for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

56

Far East/Mixed
Service Code

TP3-9

APX

PEX3

PEX2/PACAR/AAE

Distance (nm)

35,912

30,260

26,745

22,356

Average Capacities (TEU)

7,069

4,761

5,079

4,383

17

26

15

16

Port of Calls
Speed Variation (knots)

18

17

22

19

20

18

17

15

Voyage Time (days)

98

105

84

91

70

77

70

77

Days @ Sea

81

88

58

65

55

62

54

62

Number of Vessel (#)

14

15

12

13

10

11

10

11

BC/year ($/year)

15,968,571

13,552,000

10,295,000

7,650,000

16,005,000

12,005,455

8,262,000

5,918,182

IC/Year ($/year)

13,436,883

13,624,889

14,446,257

14,944,404

19,083,562

19,556,708

9,687,711

10,111,753

OPEX/year ($/year)

4,023,030

4,023,030

3,167,835

3,167,835

3,701,830

3,701,830

3,167,835

3,167,835

Total Cost/ship/year

33,428,485

31,199,919

27,909,092

25,762,239

38,790,392

35,263,993

21,117,546

19,197,769

Fleet Cost/Year

467,998,787

467,998,787

334,909,101

334,909,101

387,903,921

387,903,921

211,175,464

211,175,464

-

47,966

-

91,656

-

99,740

-

59,760

Break-Even Point
for Cargo Price ($/FEU)

Source: all calculation based on information from Drewry Container Forecast (2008, 2009, and 2010)
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